为提升中青年教师学术研究的规范性和选题前沿性，管理学院决定近期开展系列小型研讨会，邀请国内外领域专家来学院做主题报告和学术指导。2019年9月23日-24日首场研讨会主题为“共享经济与运营管理”，邀请了华南理工大学周文慧教授、华中科技大学关旭教授、复旦大学田林副教授、中国科学技术大学査勇副教授分别做主题报告和圆桌研讨。欢迎全体有兴趣的教师和研究生参加，特别欢迎学院2020年申报国家基金的教师参加会议研讨！
研讨会议程安排如下：
主题报告嘉宾
周文慧，华南理工大学教授、博导、院长助理。2019年入选国家自然科学基金委杰青，2017年入选珠江学者特聘教授，2012年入选教育部新世纪优秀人才，2010年入选广东省高等学校“千百十工程”。主要研究方向包括收益管理、质量管理、绿色供应链管理、服务运作管理，在Production and Operations Management、Decision Sciences、European Journal of Operational Research、Computers & Industrial Engineering、Naval Research Logistics、管理科学学报等国际与国内知名期刊上发表多篇论文。主持5项国家自然科学基金项目，其中重点项目1项。
报告内容简介（Abstract）：We consider a mixed duopoly service system with two service providers (SPs): one is public, and the other is private. The public SP’s goal is welfare maximization, whereas the private SP is profit driven. The two SPs’ services differ in quality, and customers are heterogeneous in terms of their quality tastes. We first consider the setting in which the private SP provides a premium service and the public SP provides a regular one. We find that interestingly, although the public SP’s goal is welfare maximization, the whole system’s welfare can be worse than that of the system with only profit-seeking private SPs. We further find that the system’s welfare can be maximized by partially privatizing the public SP, that is, changing its goal to be a level between welfare and profit maximization. In some cases, such as when the service capacity of the public SP is very small, full privatization of the public SP generates the highest social welfare for the whole system. We then check the symmetric setting in which the public SP provides a premium service and the private SP provides a regular one and obtain similar findings.
关旭，华中科技大学教授、博导，2019年入选国家自然科学基金委优青。研究兴趣主要是信息不对称环境下的供应链管理。近5年来在Production and Operations Management, Journal of Retailing, Naval Research Logistics，Decision Sciences等国际权威SCI/SSCI检索期刊发表论文20余篇。主持国家自然科学优秀青年基金/面上/青年基金，教育部人文社科规划与青年基金，中国博士后面上与特别资助基金等多项科研项目等多项。
报告内容简介（Abstract）：This paper investigates the supplier’s voluntary disclosure strategy when he can encroach on the retailer’s operations by selling directly to final consumers. The establishment of direct channel expands the market potential, induces the supplier to adopt disclosure strategy more frequently, and finally leads to a higher level of information transparency in the supply chain. This enhanced level of information transparency, however, can exert adverse impacts on the retailer’s and supplier’s profitability. Since more quality information is revealed in the presence of dual-channel, the retailer is able to free ride on the supplier’s disclosure to enhance the consumer’s quality expectation. In most cases, such a free-riding effect is positive and can even create a higher ex-ante payoff for the retailer in face of the supplier’s encroachment. Differently, more transparent quality information does not necessarily benefit the supplier, as the supplier can no longer hide those negative quality information to the consumers due to the change of channel structure. Thus, we show that the supplier’s ex-ante payoff may become lower with encroachment and the supplier would commit not to encroach on the retail market, even though he is endowing with a free option to open the direct selling channel.
田林，复旦大学管理学院副教授、博导，2019年入选国家自然科学基金委优青。研究领域为平台模式下的运营优化和营销决策问题，涉及共享平台、电商平台、在线服务平台等。研究成果发表在Management Science、Marketing Science、Journal of Marketing Research、Production and Operations Management、管理科学学报、营销科学学报等运营管理和市场营销领域国际与国内知名期刊，参与过华住酒店集团、上海烟草集团、中国东方航空、思科中国等多个企业项目。
报告内容简介（Abstract）：Mobile communications technologies and online platforms have enabled large-scale consumer-to-consumer (C2C) sharing of their under-utilized products. A product owner’s self-use values can differ over time, and in a period of low self-use value, the consumer may rent out her product in a product-sharing market. In response to consumer-to-consumer product sharing, many manufacturers (e.g., General Motors, BMW) have entered the product-sharing market to provide their own rental services in addition to outright sales to consumers. This paper develops an analytical framework to study a manufacturer’s optimal entry strategy in the product-sharing market and the economic implications of its entry. Our analysis shows that when C2C sharing has a low transaction cost and the manufacturer’s marginal cost of production is not very high, the manufacturer will find it not optimal to offer its own rental services to consumers. In contrast, when the transaction cost for C2C sharing is high or the manufacturer’s marginal cost of production is high, the manufacturer should offer enough units of the products for rental to squeeze out C2C sharing (in expectation). When the transaction cost for C2C sharing and the manufacturer’s marginal cost are both in the middle ranges, the manufacturer’s rental services and the C2C sharing will coexist, in which case the manufacturer’s entry in the product-sharing market may reduce the total number of units of the product in the whole market but increase the consumer surplus and the social welfare.
查勇，中国科学技术大学副教授、博导。主要研究方向是供应链管理与运营管理，研究兴趣包括跨界合作、消费者行为、供应链金融、Learning、数据包络分析等。主持国家自然科学基金面上/青年4项，在Naval Research Logistics (NRL)、EJOR、JORS等国际主流期刊发表论文30多篇。
报告内容简介（Abstract）：This paper presents a model for designing a trade credit contract between a supplier and a retailer that would coordinate a supply chain in the presence of investment opportunity for the retailer. Specifically, we study a newsvendor model where the supplier offers a trade credit contract to the retailer who, by delaying the payment, can invest the accounts payable amount and earn returns. We find that when the channel partners have symmetric information about the retailer’s investment return, a conditionally concessional trade credit (CTC) contract, which includes a wholesale price, an interest-free period, and a minimum order requirement, can achieve channel coordination. We then extend the model to the information asymmetry setting in which the retailer’s investment return is unobservable by the supplier. We show that, although the CTC contract cannot achieve the coordination in this setting, it can effectively improve channel efficiency as well as profitability for individual partners.
