夏军教授将于6月15日-17日在我院讲授三天的组织理论课程（详见通知，http://glxy.gdut.edu.cn/info/1091/12657.htm）。在此期间，夏教授将就自己正在研究中的working paper开展一场专题讲座。欢迎有兴趣的老师、研究生参加。
讲座题目：DEPARTURE OF COMPROMISED OUTSIDE DIRECTORS: IS DIRECTOR SOCIAL CAPITAL A LIABILITY OR A BUFFER AFTER CORPORATE MISCONDUCTS?
主讲人：夏军教授
讲座时间：2019年6月17日 14：30-16:00
举办地点：管理学院A南217教室
主讲人简介：
夏军，2006年在德克萨斯理工大学获得管理学博士学位，目前任职德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校Jindal商学院战略管理系副教授。
其研究主要集中于4个领域：组织理论（资源依赖、权力和制度过程）、公司战略（并购、合资、联盟和剥离）、社会网络（嵌入性的结果）和国际商务（国外市场拓展、国有产权和转轨/新兴国家的制度变迁）。夏军副教授已在Strategic Management Journal、Organizational Research Methods、 Management and Organization Review、 Journal of Small Business Management等期刊上发表文章。他是近几年在Strategic Management Journal上发表文章最多的华人学者之一。
讲座内容简介：
This study examines the effect of director social capital on the loss of directorship in a host firm by outside directors after their affiliated firms accused for misconduct, who are known as compromised directors. Drawing on the competing arguments rooted in expectancy violations theory and social network theory regarding whether individual social capital is a liability or a buffer after a negative firm event, we propose an inverted U-shaped relationship between social capital and departure of compromised outside directors from host firms. That is, when the director’s social capital exceeds a threshold, the buffering effect will dominate. Moreover, a host firm’s board social capital and external stakeholder attention, as demonstrated by media coverage, institutional ownership, and analyst coverage, moderate the inverted-U effect such that its turning point shifts right because these contingencies increase the threshold of buffer. Using a sample of compromised outside directors who sat on the boards of public firms penalized due to financial misconduct, we find evidence that largely support our predictions. Our findings provide insights on the equivocal argument of individual social capital after a negative firm event from different theoretical perspectives.
