报告题目：
Risk Sharing, Inventory and Financial Decisions with Cooperative Financing
报告人：
曹彬 博士生（华南理工大学 工商管理学院）
时间：2017年12月21日 14：20。
地点：管理学院第三会议室。
报告内容摘要：
This paper studies two financially-constrained firms that differ in financial status, cost, revenue or demand parameters selling two products to the (different) markets with stochastic demands. Motivated by the practice, the firms can together finance their operating decisions from the bank through cooperation. Under such cooperation, when one firm does not have enough sales revenue to repay all its obligations to the bank, the other firm must provide a completely guarantee for this firm, which is referred as sharing (bankruptcy) risk each other. Using a non-cooperative game, we then explicitly incorporate this risk-sharing role into a debt-financed model with the two firms getting the needed loan cooperatively, and prove the existence of equilibrium inventory levels of the firms. We demonstrate that the two firms are simultaneously more aggressive in ordering as the risk they additionally share with the other firm goes up. It interestingly reveals that compared with our benchmark model that the two firms individually finance their operating decisions, each firm with cooperative financing mode whose interest rate is less than that of individual financing always places a higher inventory level. More importantly, we find that the equilibrium financing mode is completely determined by a two-threshold policy: If the two firms' cash levels are less than a certain threshold of cash position and the advantage of cooperative financing over individual financing is larger than another certain threshold, they simultaneously choose cooperative financing; otherwise, they choose individual financing. Our results further suggest that cooperative financing mode becomes a ``win-win'' arrangement for the bank and the two firms who are financially weak, as long as the cooperative-financing interest rate exogenously charged by the bank is within a reasonable region. Moreover, we provide some managerial implications of how to select the partners for the firms who want to adopt cooperative financing.
【曹彬个人简介】
曹彬，华南理工大学工商管理学院博士生，伊利诺伊大学香槟分校联合培养博士。研究方向为供应链金融和运作与营销的交叉研究。目前，在《European Journal of Operational Research》、《Computers & Industrial Engineering》和《Journal of the Operational Research Society》等SCI/SSCI期刊上发表论文3篇，1篇EI论文，3篇论文审稿中。
学院高层次人才引进办公室
2017-12-19
